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Abstract 
When product quality is unverifiable by third parties, enforceable contracts that 
condition price upon quality are not feasible. If higher quality is also costly to deliver, 
moral hazard by sellers flourishes, particularly when procurement is via a 
competitive auction process. Retainage is a contractual mechanism that presents a 
solution to the third-party unverifiability problem, by setting aside a portion of the 
purchase price. After delivery, the buyer has sole discretion over the amount of 
retainage money that is released to the seller. While generally a feasible contract form 
to implement, retainage introduces a moral hazard for the buyer. We use laboratory 
experiments to investigate how and when retainage might be successfully used to 
facilitate trust and trustworthiness in procurement contracts. We observe that 
retainage induces a significant improvement in product quality when there are some 
trustworthy buyers in the population, consistent with a model of fair payment norms 
that we develop. This improvement is realized at the cost of increased buyer-seller 
profit inequalities. We also observe that at high levels of retainage, there is a welfare-
decreasing market unraveling in which sellers do not bid on contracts. Our results 
imply that retainage incentives can mitigate the tension between competition and 
cooperation arising from reverse auctions, but only at appropriate levels of retainage. 
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1. Introduction 
Technological advances allow enterprises access to increasing numbers of potential sellers. 
Reverse auctions leverage this increased access into greater competition and downward price 
pressure. In an interview with Fortune, General Electric’s then CIO claimed to use reverse 
auctions for nearly one third of their total buy.1 Regulations in the Unites States now also require 
the allocation of most public-sector procurement projects via competitive auction processes 
(Bajari et al. 2014). The implied cost-savings for buyers are in the region of 10 to 40% 
(Elmaghraby 2007). At a first glance, the use of price-based auctions would appear to improve 
procurement efficiency and benefit the buyer. Unlike in other market settings, however, in 
procurement, the auction often marks the beginning rather than the end of the transaction. For 
many goods, sellers determine their final product quality after the contractual allocation process.  
As a consequence, price competition can erode trust in buyer-seller relationships. In 
complex projects, it is difficult for a buyer to write complete contracts that condition price on 
quality. Litigation is often expensive to pursue in practice. A classic moral hazard problem arises, 
in which a seller has limited financial incentive to restore product quality with costly action post-
auction. For example, Emiliani and Stec (2005) observed that auctions encourage unethical cost-
cutting behavior by sellers to preserve profit margins. This dynamic is likely to result in 
inefficiency. Thus, we see preferences among procurers for repeat purchases from a smaller 
group of certified suppliers and the establishment of reputational mechanisms. 
In this paper, we explore an alternative solution to the seller moral hazard problem, by 
introducing price flexibility into the contract via retainage. A retainage provision, or retention as 
it is known outside the US, is a pre-agreed percentage of the contractual price withheld from a 
seller by the buyer. The buyer in this context might be a client, main contractor or sub-contractor 
withholding money from a lower tier. After product delivery, the buyer has discretion over how 
much of the retainage money to return to the seller.  Retainage thereby permits the buyer to offer 
voluntary and unenforceable incentives to the seller for good performance (Raina and Tookey 
2013). Whereas complete contracts require the capacity of third parties to verify and enforce 
quality-contingent prices, a retainage provision relies at least in part upon the buyer’s 
trustworthiness to fairly compensate suppliers for quality delivered. 
Retainage has its origins in nineteenth-century British railway construction, when it was 
set at 20% of contractual value (Bausman 2004). Today, typical provisions range from 3 to 10%. 
A construction sector consultation in 2017 by the United Kingdom Department of Business, 
Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS 2017) estimated the size of retainage monies held in England 
 
1 http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2008/07/21/105711270/index.htm?p
ostversion=2008071010. 
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alone at £4.5 billion. Around 75% of contractors and 85% of clients surveyed had experienced 
retainage at some point during the preceding three years. Retainage provisions were included in 
the majority of ongoing construction contracts and most prevalent in contracts of high value.2  
Where sellers produce a relationship-specific product prior to receiving compensation, 
they accept vulnerability to uncertain behavior during trade.3 Retainage is due on substantial 
completion of a project, at which point half of the money is released immediately and the 
remainder is released after the expiration of a defects liability period. Substantial completion is 
difficult to verify, and generally is at the discretion of the buyer, creating conditions ripe for 
opportunistic buyer behavior. Measures to safeguard cash retainage vary by country.4 Over half 
of contractors surveyed by BEIS had experienced full or partial non-repayment of retainage 
monies by buyers, who chose – often unjustifiably – not to return retainage monies due. This acted 
as a financial constraint and generated a counter-productive increase in procurement costs. 
Buyer recognition of the hidden cost of retainage has driven a downward trend in the maximum 
retainage provision permitted by several US states (ASA 2018). Thus, retainage introduces a new 
countervailing buyer moral hazard, shifting the burden of trust in procurement away from the 
buyer to the seller. 
This buyer moral hazard problem is accentuated in many informal procurement 
arrangements, such as those based on a letter of intent (LOI). There are various types of LOI, from 
a mere handshake agreement stating the intention of parties to trade, to an interim contract that 
is – in theory – replaced by a binding contract on expiration, to a final but non-binding trade 
agreement in its own right. The use of LOIs for initiating works quickly and in the absence of a 
legally binding contract is “widespread” in the UK construction industry (Wevill 2015, p 29). If 
work proceeds based on an LOI, then the buyer, while not explicitly designating withheld monies 
as retainage, withholds a high percentage of the purchase price up front. It is not difficult to 
specify production cost structures which expose potential sellers to large losses and deters them 
from participating in requests for quotes. When sellers do not participate in the contracting 
process, we call this market unraveling.  
 
2 In the UK, standard building contracts are produced by the Joint Contracts Tribunal, which encourages 
the holding of retention monies until practical completion (for details, see https://www.jctltd.co.uk/). 
3 Özer and Zheng (2017) define trust in the supply chain as a voluntary decision “to accept vulnerability 
due to uncertain behavior of another (the trustee), based upon the expectation of a positive outcome” (p 
495). Trustworthiness is a voluntary behavior “in a way not to take advantage of the trustor’s vulnerable 
position when faced with a self-serving decision that conflicts with the trustor’s objective” (p 497). The 
importance of the market environment in determining trust behaviors is documented by Özer et al. (2011).  
4 The European Commission (2009, clause 41) prescribes that retainage monies “are not paid until the 
satisfaction of conditions specified in the contract for the payment of such amounts or until defects have 
been rectified.” In New Zealand, the 2015 Construction Contracts Amendment Bill provides additional 
protection for the payment of retainage monies to sub-contractors. In China, retainage applies to pre-
specified defects liability periods and at the time of writing enjoy additional financial guarantees from the 
Agricultural Bank of China. 
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The peril of supplying under an LOI, without a concrete payment schedule, is 
demonstrated by a notable English contract law case. In 2005, RTS Systems won a competitive 
tender to supply improved food packaging for the German dairy manufacturer Müller. Work 
began based on an LOI and Müller paid RTS only 30% of the agreed price up front and a further 
40% later on. After expiration of the LOI and repeated deferral in the execution of a binding 
contract, Müller alleged product defects and refused to pay RTS the remaining 30% of the tender 
price. A protracted and costly legal battle ensued, centered around the basis for which a 
contractual agreement existed. The Supreme Court Justice pronounced on judgement day that 
“the moral of the story is to agree first and to start work later” (RTS Flexible Systems v Molkerei 
Alois Müller [2010]). If LOIs are indeed widespread, they are liable to deter participation of 
potential sellers in the contracting process. 
We use laboratory experiments to conduct the first controlled assessment of how 
retainage incentives influence procurement outcomes, while preserving access to a large pool of 
potential sellers and a commitment to procure at the lowest price.5 By varying the percentage of 
the contract price withheld by the buyer until after delivery of the product, we shift the relative 
burdens of trust between buyer and seller. Specifically, we compare the performance of 
procurement contracts allocated at a price-based auction in which there is either (i) zero 
retainage – a fixed-price contract, (ii) a retainage provision set such that potential sellers can 
adjust their bid upwards to compensate for the increased risk of non-payment of monies, or (iii) 
a high retainage arrangement – analogous to an LOI – in which the buyer pays only a small 
percentage of the contract price up front, and consequently potential sellers cannot fully 
compensate for future production costs incurred by bidding higher. These three arrangements 
approximate the real-world market conditions discussed above. That is, there is either a one-
sided seller moral hazard problem, a two-sided buyer and seller moral hazard problem, or a one-
sided buyer moral hazard problem. Standard theory predicts that efficiency will be low in the first 
two contractual arrangements and nil in the third arrangement as the market unravels.  
In our setup, payment of retainage monies ex post is voluntary and so, according to 
standard theory, generates no improvement in product quality. We develop an alternative model 
of fair payment norms to demonstrate that, if sellers believe there are some trustworthy buyers 
in the population, high product quality can emerge in anticipation of a reciprocal payment. By 
doing so, we contribute to a growing behavioral operations literature addressing how social 
preferences influence supply chain contracting (Beer et al. 2018, Cui et al. 2007, Davis and 
 
5 In a non-competitive setting, Hoppe and Schmitz (2011) observe in an experiment that renegotiable 
option contracts can help solve the hold-up problem if sellers are endowed with bargaining power. A 
similar framework has been applied to the supply chain setting by Davis and Leider (2018). 
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Hyndman 2018, Hu et al. 2017, Katok and Pavlov 2013, Loch and Wu 2008, Pavlov, Katok and 
Zhang 2020).  
Our experimental results support the model of fair payment norms. In the baseline zero 
retainage arrangement, the market collapses to an inefficient, low quality outcome. This is 
consistent with prior laboratory studies of reverse auctions with seller moral hazard and zero 
price flexibility (Brosig-Koch and Heinrich 2014, Fugger et al. 2019). We find that a retainage 
provision can significantly improve product quality in a two-sided moral hazard environment. 
Yet a failure of potential sellers to fully adjust their bidding behavior in anticipation of variable 
retainage payments means that buyers appropriate the increased social surplus. 6 Sellers are 
vulnerable to loss when bearing the full burden of contractual trust in our high retainage 
arrangement. This often leads to market unraveling. 
The present study builds on a well-established experimental economics literature 
examining trust and trustworthiness in principal-agent settings. Our baseline seller moral hazard 
environment integrates the gift-exchange game of Fehr et al. (1993) into an auction setting. In a 
typical gift-exchange game, participants are assigned to the role of either buyer or seller and 
participate in a two stage exchange. First, the buyer sets a price. Second, the seller produces a 
costly product quality and creates the trade surplus. In the absence of reputational considerations, 
if there is a preannounced and finite number of repetitions, then the seller should incur the 
minimum production cost possible and receive the lowest available price. In contrast, 
experiments of the gift exchange game without competition, typically observed a positive 
relationship between price and quality, yielding a Pareto improvement relative to the equilibrium 
prediction and lending support to Akerlof’s (1982) gift-exchange hypothesis (e.g. Anderhub et al. 
2002, Fehr et al. 1997, Fehr et al. 1998, Fehr et al. 2007). 
The existence of positive and negative reciprocity is robust in the laboratory to the 
imposition of demanding market institutions (Fehr and Falk 1999). This behavior can be 
rationalized with theories of distributional social preferences (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Fehr 
and Schmidt 1999). Yet, during first price reverse auctions, in which buyers can only transact 
with the lowest-priced seller, competition forces bids down to minimum cost. High quality is then 
not a profitable seller strategy. The discontinuity in quality choice as a function of price is a direct 
result of the incomplete contracting model (Hart 1995, Hart and Moore 1988). 
 
6 Auction models in which contract renegotiation leads to lower prices ex post are considered by Waehrer 
(1995) and Wang (2000). Shachat and Tan (2015) consider an auction-bargaining mechanism in which 
sellers compete at an English auction to deliver an indivisible good to a buyer. They find that re-negotiated 
prices are below the winning bid although, contrary to the Nash prediction, final and initial prices are 
positively correlated in an experiment. Herweg and Schwarz (2018) investigate cost overruns and the 
possibility of price increases when the seller is endowed with bargaining power. Chang et al. (2016) find 
that wealth-constrained sellers can use the credible threat of default to obtain higher prices through 
renegotiation. 
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By designing different price-setting institutions, prior auction studies have shown that it 
is possible to improve trade efficiency in environments with seller moral hazard.7 Most closely 
related to this paper are Fugger et al. (2019) and Brosig-Koch and Heinrich (2014). These studies 
restrict attention to the nature of the auction selection rule with fixed-price (i.e., zero retainage) 
contracts. Fugger et al. (2019) show that simply giving buyers the option to select a seller who 
did not place the lowest bid (called a buyer-determined auction) significantly raises prices and 
quality levels. Like in our study, interactions are one-shot, no reputation information is available 
and buyers must accept vulnerability to loss so as to incentivize high quality. The authors employ 
a multi-level cost and quality design, across two different buyer valuation schedules. Their 
experimental data reveal that buyer-determined auctions yield a robust improvement in 
cooperation and efficiency and they rationalize this finding using a model of inequity-averse 
preferences. 
Brosig-Koch and Heinrich (2014) consider a similar buyer-determined auction setup in 
which buyers can condition procurement acceptance decisions on past seller performance. 
Providing reputation information in this way significantly increases buyer profits and 
procurement quality, relative to a binding price-based auction format. Unlike in Brosig-Koch and 
Heinrich (2014) and Fugger et al. (2019), we deliberately consider a binding price-based auction 
format to rule out the possibility that buyers choose the bid as a signal of quality. Buyer-
determined auctions and reputational systems clearly have an important trust-building role in 
procurement. By contrast, we are interested in isolating the impact of contractual incentives 
during price competition without the confounding effect of alternative selection mechanisms. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we outline the setting and derive 
competing analytical results from the standard theory and a model of fair payment norms. In 
section 3, we derive testable hypotheses and summarize the experimental design. In section 4, 
we present our experiment results and conduct a formal statistical analysis. In section 5, we 
estimate parameters of our fairness model from the data and benchmark these with previous 
literature. In section 6, we conclude by drawing implications for managerial decision-making and 
procurement contract design. 
 
7 The first experimental analysis of procurement contracts in reverse auctions with moral hazard was 
conducted by Cox et al. (1996). They compared fixed-price and cost-sharing contracts. Their main finding 
was a trade-off between budgetary expense and efficiency. Although contracts with a greater cost-sharing 
element involved less procurement expense, they were also less efficient due to heightened seller moral 
hazard. Cost-sharing arrangements tend to be more appropriate for complex projects, accompanied by low 
degrees of design completeness (Bajari and Tadelis 2001). For the procurement of complex goods, a buyer 
commitment to negotiate with one seller can outperform an auction when there is adverse selection, scope 
for product improvements and/or costly renegotiation (Herweg and Schmidt 2017). 
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2. Model and Theory 
Consider a one-shot procurement interaction in which one buyer seeks to purchase one 
unit of an indivisible product from a group of 𝑛𝑛 potential sellers, indexed by i. A first price sealed 
bid auction determines selection of the winning seller and the contract price. Auction 
participation is voluntary for sellers, and the buyer can choose to not purchase after observing 
the contract price.8 The winning seller can produce either a high- or low-quality unit, but the 
setting prohibits quality contingent contracts. 
In this setting, the contract price is less binding than usual as purchases are made with 
retainage provisions. Such a provision includes a retainage proportion 𝜌𝜌, which is a fraction of 
the contract price withheld from the seller until after production.9 A general interpretation of 𝜌𝜌 
is the degree of contractual flexibility. After production of the unit, the buyer learns of the chosen 
product quality. The amount of retainage released to the seller is then at the buyer’s discretion. 
The retainage proportion thus regulates each party’s trust burden: at low levels, the buyer 
possesses limited insurance against low quality production; at high levels, the seller is vulnerable 
to financially damaging retainage return decisions.  
Figure 1 displays the sequence of events. In the Bidding Stage, each potential seller 
simultaneously submits his bid, 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 , or chooses not to participate. If at least one seller submits a 
bid, the one submitting the lowest bid wins the auction and the contract price is the winner’s bid, 
𝑝𝑝 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛{𝑏𝑏1,⋯ , 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛}. Ties are broken randomly. If no bid is submitted, all parties earn zero and we 
call this outcome “market unraveling”. When an auction succeeds, the profile of bidding-stage 
actions is announced before the next stage.  
In the Procurement Stage, the buyer either rejects the auction outcome, resulting in all 
parties earning zero, or he accepts the outcome and pays (1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑝𝑝 to the winner. We call a buyer 
rejection “transaction failure”. The buyer’s Procurement Stage action is 𝑎𝑎 ∈ {𝑎𝑎0,𝑎𝑎1}, where 𝑎𝑎0 is 
a rejection and 𝑎𝑎1 is an acceptance.  
In the Production Stage, the seller chooses to produce either a high- or low-quality 
product, 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿, 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻} . The seller incurs a sunk production cost 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗)  for quality level j.  
Production cost schedules are the same across potential sellers and this is common knowledge. A 
seller’s cost of producing high quality is strictly greater than his cost of producing low quality, 
𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻) > 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿). Likewise, the buyer’s valuation of the unit is increasing in quality and given by the 
expression 𝑣𝑣�𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗�. We denote 𝑠𝑠(𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗) = 𝑣𝑣�𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗� as the surplus created by the transaction.  
 
 
8 The inclusion of a participation decision for both buyer and seller ensures trust is a voluntary decision. 
9 When 𝜌𝜌 = 1, bidding simply constitutes a promise of payment, i.e., uninformative cheap talk. 
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Figure 1. The sequence of events in our procurement model. 
 
Notes: This is an extensive game tree representation of the strategic interaction. Sellers 
move first and either submit a bid 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖  at auction or choose not to participate. If a market 
forms, the buyer can either accept to trade with the lowest bidder and make a guaranteed 
payment equal to (1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑝𝑝, or refuse the transaction. The winning seller then selects to 
produce a high quality, 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻, or low quality, 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿, product and incurs the production cost 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗). 
The buyer is informed about the product value, 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗) , and decides on a discretionary 
proportion r of the retainage money 𝜌𝜌𝑝𝑝 to pay to the winning seller. The winning seller 
earns a profit equal to the difference between total payment received and the cost incurred. 
The buyer earns a profit equal to the difference between value received and the total 
payment made. Non-trading parties earn zero profit. 
 
From a welfare perspective, trade is preferred to no trade and surplus is increasing in quality, i.e., 
 𝑠𝑠(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻) > 𝑠𝑠(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿) ≥ 0. Finally, in the Payment Stage, the buyer observes the quality and then selects 
a fraction, r, of the retainage money to return to the seller. 
Formally, a potential seller i’s strategy has two components. These are a Bidding Stage 
action 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ∈ {[𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿),𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻)], 𝑏𝑏0} , where bids can be submitted from a continuous interval between 
the seller’s minimum production cost and the buyer’s maximum valuation for the unit (inclusive), 
and 𝑏𝑏0 is non-participation; and a quality choice function 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖|𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝,𝑎𝑎 = 𝑎𝑎1). A buyer’s strategy 
also has two components: a procurement decision function, 𝑎𝑎(𝑝𝑝) ; and a retainage payment 
function, 𝑟𝑟(𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖| 𝑎𝑎 = 𝑎𝑎1). 
The profits of transacting buyers and the winning seller are, 
Buyer’s profit :  𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 = 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗)  − (1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑝𝑝 − 𝑟𝑟𝜌𝜌𝑝𝑝 
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Seller’s profit :   𝜋𝜋𝑆𝑆 = (1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑝𝑝 + 𝑟𝑟𝜌𝜌𝑝𝑝 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗� 
Our primary interest is in whether and under what conditions there exists an equilibrium 
solution that implements high quality. High quality is implementable if it yields a non-negative 
expected payoff to the transacting parties (buyer and seller participate voluntarily) and it is 
incentive compatible (preferred to low quality by the seller). 
2.1 Standard Theory 
In this first approach, we assume the buyer and sellers are expected profit-maximizers. 
We proceed to solve for the subgame perfect equilibria using backward induction.10  
Proposition 1.  
A. For 𝜌𝜌 ∈ [0, 1 − 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿) 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻)⁄ ], there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which 
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿) (1 − 𝜌𝜌)⁄  for all i, 𝑎𝑎∗ = 𝑎𝑎1, 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿 and 𝑟𝑟∗ = 0. 
B. For 𝜌𝜌 ∈ (1 − 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿) 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻)⁄ , 1], there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which 
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑏𝑏0 for all i, and the market unravels; off the equilibrium path, 𝑎𝑎∗ = 𝑎𝑎1, 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿 
and 𝑟𝑟∗ = 0. 
Proof. A. The trade quality and contract price are known in the Payment Stage. Since the buyer’s 
profit is decreasing in the retainage return fraction 𝑟𝑟, the buyer will always choose 𝑟𝑟 = 0.11 In the 
Production Stage, with certain zero retainage payment, low quality always yields higher profit 
than high quality. In the Procurement Stage, the buyer anticipates this and accepts to procure for 
all 𝑝𝑝 ≤ 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿)/(1 − 𝜌𝜌). In the Bidding Stage, each seller’s expected profit maximizing bid is the 
cost of low quality marked up in proportion to the retainage money vulnerable to loss, generating 
an expected profit of zero. Deviation to a higher price would also yield zero profit, due to the 
binding auction selection rule. Since 𝜌𝜌 ≤ 1 − 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿) 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻)⁄ , withdrawing from the market would 
not improve their position. For all bids strictly above 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿)/(1 − 𝜌𝜌), a potential seller has an 
incentive to unilaterally undercut his competitors in the continuous bid interval: by doing so, he 
can increase the probability of trade from 1/𝑛𝑛 to one. The full trade surplus accrues to the buyer.  
B. For higher retainage proportions, 𝜌𝜌 > 1 − 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿) 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻)⁄ , there exists no price in the available 
bid interval that would induce a seller to participate. Thus, the only rationalizable action in the 
Bidding Stage is 𝑏𝑏0. Participation would enable the buyer not only to appropriate the transaction 
 
10 Other Nash equilibria exist at higher prices and associated with non-participation, but since none of these 
outcomes are compatible with high quality, we ignore them here. 
11 For the special case of zero retainage, the Payment Stage is obsolete. 
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surplus, but to appropriate part of the seller’s cost outlay. Off the equilibrium path, the rationale 
for payment, production and procurement decisions are the same as in part A. ∎ 
The standard theory tells us that below a retainage threshold determined by the ratio of 
a seller’s minimum production cost to the buyer’s maximum valuation for the product, the market 
will collapse to an inefficient (low quality) outcome. Above this threshold, the burden of trust is 
too high for sellers to participate and the market unravels. 
2.2 A Model of Fair Payment Norms 
In a second approach, we adopt a simplified version of Bolton and Ockenfels’ (2000) ERC 
theory: the 𝛼𝛼 model. Suppose again that potential sellers compete anonymously in the Bidding 
Stage and that in the Procurement Stage, the buyer accepts any project she expects to be 
profitable. A buyer’s agreement to purchase initiates a fundamental transformation (Williamson 
1985). Now suppose that, after the fundamental transformation takes place, fair payment 
concerns become salient in the buyer-seller relationship. A fixed proportion 𝛼𝛼 of buyers in the 
population are concerned about making a fair payment to sellers for quality provided, to the 
extent that discretion is permitted in the contract. Denote those buyers as “trustworthy”. The 
remaining proportion (1 − 𝛼𝛼) of buyers care only about maximizing their own payoff, as before. 
Denote these buyers as “self-interested”. Whether a buyer is trustworthy or self-interested is 
private information, but the proportion 𝛼𝛼 is common knowledge to all agents. 
This rather spare model enables approximation of the population propensity to 
reciprocate using a single parameter 𝛼𝛼 . 12  Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) assume that the fair 
reference point in a bilateral relationship is the 50-50 surplus split.13 We extend their 𝛼𝛼 model to 
incorporate the observation that not all supply chain relationships are created equal (Cui et al. 
2007), by permitting the fair reference point to vary.  
Trustworthy buyers’ payoffs for terminal nodes following the Procurement Stage reflect 
a preference to minimize the difference between the winning seller’s realized surplus share 
received, 𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆 = 𝜋𝜋𝑆𝑆/𝑠𝑠(𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗), and a reference fair surplus share, 𝛾𝛾 > 0.14 The seller’s realized surplus 
share can be negative. The parameter 𝛾𝛾 is exogenous and represents a fair payment norm, which 
in practice will be context-specific. Note that while the fairness norm is independent of the quality 
 
12 Bolton and Ockenfels (2000, p 167) succinctly explain the rationale for such an approach: “much of what 
we need to know has to do with the thresholds at which behavior deviates from the ‘more money is 
preferred to less’ assumption”. 
13 When assuming a 50-50 fair reference point, related models of fairness (e.g. inequity aversion à la Fehr 
and Schmidt 1999) yield qualitatively similar results for bilateral trade relationships. 
14 Production costs are included in surplus share comparisons, based on prior evidence from hold-up 
experiments that buyers consider sunk costs when making decisions on final surplus divisions (Ellingsen 
and Johannesson 2004, Hackett 1994). 
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level, the payment action that achieves a payoff outcome consistent with this norm does depend 
on the price and quality.15 Thus in the Payment Stage, a trustworthy buyer sets r so as to minimize 
the absolute distance |𝑟𝑟𝜌𝜌𝑝𝑝 + (1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤(𝑞𝑞|𝛾𝛾)| , where the reference fair total payment 
𝑤𝑤(𝑞𝑞|𝛾𝛾) = 𝛾𝛾𝑣𝑣�𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗� + (1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗� is a function of the chosen product quality, conditional on the 
prevailing fairness norm. 
There are some notable special cases in this game of incomplete information. The 
standard theory is captured by 𝛼𝛼 = 0. Interestingly, if 𝛼𝛼 = 1, sellers know that all buyers are 
trustworthy and so there is always an incentive to place either a marginally or substantially lower 
bid in the available interval, associated with low quality. The presence of self-interested types in 
the population is necessary for high quality to emerge. When 𝜌𝜌 = 0, the model collapses to an 
extensive-form game of complete information and Proposition 1A applies. Thus, in fixed-price 
contracts, high quality is never an implementable outcome regardless of the level of population 
reciprocity.  
Let us now assume that there is some degree of flexibility in the contract, i.e., 𝜌𝜌 > 0, and 
sellers have incomplete information about a buyer’s payment preferences, i.e., 𝛼𝛼 ∈ (0,1). The 
resulting model can be analyzed as an extensive-form game of incomplete information. We apply 
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium solution concept and restrict attention to pure strategy equilibria. 
This requires that beliefs correspond to the objective probabilities for all equilibrium actions.  
In the Payment Stage, a self-interested buyer always returns zero retainage. Let 𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆′ denote 
a seller i’s interim surplus share, i.e. if the retainage return will be zero. If 𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆′ ≥ 𝛾𝛾, a trustworthy 
buyer will also return zero retainage. If 𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆′ < 𝛾𝛾, she will return the retainage fraction necessary to 
achieve a profit distribution as close as possible to the fair reference point. The best-response 
payment function for a trustworthy buyer is defined in (1) and produces an interior or corner 
solution depending on the price and quality level.  
𝑟𝑟(𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖) = �
0,                                                         𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆′ ≥ 𝛾𝛾
min �
𝑤𝑤(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖|𝛾𝛾)
𝜌𝜌𝑝𝑝
−
(1 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝜌𝜌
, 1� ,     𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆′ < 𝛾𝛾
  (1) 
where 𝑤𝑤(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖|𝛾𝛾) is non-decreasing in seller i’s quality choice. 
Corollary 1: The retainage return fraction in exchange for high quality is weakly higher than the 
retainage return fraction for low quality. 
 
15 In other words, 𝛾𝛾 is not an injunctive norm by which high quality is perceived as morally right and low 
quality as morally wrong. Instead, it represents a community - or industry - norm as to what constitutes 
fair payment for works provided. 
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In the Production Stage, the seller anticipates the retainage payment decisions of buyers 
on average and chooses a quality level to maximize his expected monetary payoff as follows: 
𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑆𝑆] = (1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑝𝑝 + 𝐸𝐸(𝑟𝑟; 𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖)𝜌𝜌𝑝𝑝 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗�  ,  
where a seller’s expectation of the retainage return fraction given a quality function and bid is 
driven by the posterior belief of the proportion of trustworthy buyers in the population, 
𝐸𝐸(𝑟𝑟; 𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟(𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖). (2) 
We obtain a second corollary. 
Corollary 2: The lowest bid that can implement high quality is 𝑏𝑏𝐻𝐻 = 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞
𝐻𝐻�
1−𝜌𝜌+𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌(𝑟𝑟;𝑝𝑝,𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻)
. 
Proof. The expression is obtained directly by setting the seller’s expected payoff function to zero 
and solving for the bid, where 𝐸𝐸(𝑟𝑟; 𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻) is defined in (2). The bid 𝑏𝑏𝐻𝐻 is decreasing in 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛾𝛾, 
and increasing in 𝜌𝜌. ∎ 
The seller will prefer to produce high over low quality when the expected payment 
premium more than compensates him for the increase in production cost. We require ex post 
incentive compatibility (EPIC): 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸:  𝛼𝛼 ≥
𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻) − 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿)
(𝑟𝑟(𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻) − 𝑟𝑟(𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿))𝜌𝜌𝑝𝑝
  , (3) 
The numerator is the marginal cost of producing high quality. The denominator is the expected 
marginal return of producing high quality, i.e., the difference in retainage returns from a 
trustworthy buyer in exchange for high over low quality. At its binding level, EPIC is concave 
upward for sufficiently high auction prices and has a global minimum at a price equal to 𝑤𝑤(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻|𝛾𝛾), 
which splits the surplus according to the fair payment norm exactly.16 
Since trade is voluntary, any equilibrium seller bidding strategy must also satisfy ex post 
participation (EPPC): 
 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸:  𝛼𝛼 ≥ max �
𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿) − (1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑝𝑝
𝑟𝑟(𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿)𝜌𝜌𝑝𝑝
,
𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻) − (1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑝𝑝
𝑟𝑟(𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻)𝜌𝜌𝑝𝑝
� (4) 
 
16 At contract prices below 𝑤𝑤𝜇𝜇(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻), EPIC is non-increasing in price as (𝑟𝑟(𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻) − 𝑟𝑟(𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿)) becomes larger. 
At contract prices above 𝑤𝑤𝜇𝜇(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻), EPIC is non-decreasing in price as (𝑟𝑟(𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻) − 𝑟𝑟(𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿)) becomes smaller. 
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which is defined for all 𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆′ < 𝛾𝛾 and is non-decreasing in the retainage proportion. At all interim 
surplus shares greater than 𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆′, EPPC is satisfied. We obtain a third corollary. 
Corollary 3: With a larger discretionary payment component, a higher proportion of trustworthy 
buyers is required for the market not to unravel. 
Proof. First, note that regardless of 𝛼𝛼 and 𝜌𝜌, a necessary condition for a bid to be profitable in 
expectation is that it exceeds the seller’s production cost. For all such bids, the numerators in (4) 
represent the additional compensation that a seller requires to break even after the Production 
Stage. This requirement is strictly increasing in 𝜌𝜌. Second, recall that a trustworthy buyer prefers 
the seller to receive 𝑤𝑤(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖|𝛾𝛾) , which is strictly above the requirement stated in the relevant 
numerator and is independent of 𝜌𝜌 . A trustworthy buyer’s preference is constrained by the 
available retainage money 𝜌𝜌𝑝𝑝. For any given bid and quality level, an increase in the retainage 
proportion will not change the relevant denominator in (4) because the trustworthy buyer’s 
retainage return adjusts to exactly, or less than, offset the increase in 𝜌𝜌𝑝𝑝. This can be seen from 
inspection of (1).  ∎  
We can now characterize trade conditions under which there exists a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium associated with high product quality. 
Proposition 2. If 𝜌𝜌 > 0, 𝛼𝛼 ∈ (0,1) and 𝑏𝑏𝐻𝐻 ∈ [𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿),𝑤𝑤(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻|𝛾𝛾)], then there exists a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium in pure strategies characterized as follows: 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑏𝑏𝐻𝐻  for all i, 𝑎𝑎∗ = 𝑎𝑎1 , 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻, 
trustworthy buyers return 𝑟𝑟∗(𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖) and self-interested buyers return 𝑟𝑟∗ = 0. 
Proof. Suppose 𝛼𝛼 and 𝜌𝜌 are such that a choice of high quality is EPPC and EPIC at some available 
bid 𝑏𝑏 ≤ 𝑤𝑤(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻|𝛾𝛾) . In the Procurement Stage, a buyer will accept a price in this region 
independently of whether she is trustworthy or self-interested, because it guarantees her a non-
negative profit. The procurement decision is therefore uninformative, and the seller does not 
update his prior belief about 𝛼𝛼. In the Bidding Stage, there is no incentive for a potential seller to 
deviate to a higher bid because it would yield zero selection probability at auction. To ensure that 
there is no incentive for a potential seller to submit any lower bid from the available interval, we 
require that 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑆𝑆�𝑏𝑏 − 𝜀𝜀, 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗  �] − 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑆𝑆(𝑏𝑏, 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻)] ≤ 0 ∀ 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {𝐿𝐿,𝐻𝐻}. This condition is satisfied for 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 
when 𝛼𝛼 is at a weakly decreasing point on the EPIC, which from its concavity is true at all bids 
below 𝑤𝑤(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻|𝛾𝛾). Since high quality is EPIC and the EPPC (by inspection) is strictly decreasing in 
price, it must also be true for 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿. It follows from the monotonicity of the payoff functions and from 
Corollary 2 that the lowest bid that satisfies these conditions is 𝑏𝑏𝐻𝐻. Thus, if 𝑏𝑏𝐻𝐻 ∈ [𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿),𝑤𝑤(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻|𝛾𝛾)], 
then a seller bidding strategy composed of this bid combined with high quality is an equilibrium 
strategy. ∎  
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The intuition for Proposition 2 is captured in Figure 2. When 𝛼𝛼 = 0, the winning seller’s 
expected payoff functions, conditional on quality, are linear in the bid. With a strict mixture of 
trustworthy and self-interested buyer types in the population, the seller’s payoff functions remain 
monotonic but are now non-linear in the bid. The more optimistic the commonly held belief about 
the level of population trustworthiness 𝛼𝛼 , the wider the range of available seller bidding 
strategies (combination of bid and quality level) which generate a non-negative profit in 
expectation. If there exists a feasible belief on 𝛼𝛼  and retainage proportion 𝜌𝜌  for which a 
combination of bid 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 < 𝑤𝑤(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻|𝛾𝛾) and high quality breaks even, then there can be no incentive for 
a seller to undercut to any lower bid so long as a combination of the same bid with low quality 
would generate a loss. The result breaks down as 𝛼𝛼  goes to 1, because the knowledge of a 
guaranteed fair payment restores the seller’s marginal incentive to undercut his competitor until 
reaching the minimum production cost. 
To demonstrate that Proposition 2 is interesting, consider the following example. Suppose 
that 𝑛𝑛 = 2 potential sellers compete to win a procurement contract under the following cost and 
valuation schedules: 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿) = 0.30, 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻) = 0.40, 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿) = 0.35 and 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻) = 0.80 (units in tens of 
thousands). By setting 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻) > 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿) we ensure that, with zero retainage provision, the buyer 
must accept vulnerability due to uncertain seller production.17 In Figure 3, we depict equilibrium 
outcomes at all (𝛼𝛼, 𝛾𝛾) pairs in the unit square, for two non-zero retainage arrangements: 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 
and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 . We will test these retainage arrangements in the laboratory experiment. Blue 
circles in the figure indicate (𝛼𝛼, 𝛾𝛾)  pairs for which low quality is the equilibrium outcome 
predicted by Proposition 2. Green squares indicate (𝛼𝛼, 𝛾𝛾)  pairs for which high quality is the 
equilibrium outcome predicted by Proposition 2. The numbers inside the shapes correspond to 
the equilibrium bid amounts.18 
The figure demonstrates that if high quality is to be implementable, then given a retainage 
level, sellers must be sufficiently – but not overly – optimistic in their expectation of interacting 
with a trustworthy buyer. In the implementable regions, the more optimistic the belief about 
population trustworthiness 𝛼𝛼 and/or payment norm 𝛾𝛾, the (weakly) lower the equilibrium bid. 
The empty region in the right-hand panel is associated with seller non-participation in the high 
retainage arrangement (𝜌𝜌 = 0.75), when beliefs about population reciprocity are sufficiently 
pessimistic to deter a potential seller from entering a bid. 
 
  
  
 
17 This is in-keeping with Özer and Zheng’s (2017) definition of trust in the supply chain. 
18 Recall for 𝜌𝜌 = 0, trade is predicted to be inefficient (low quality) in this model independently of 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛾𝛾. 
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Figure 2. Seller bidding incentives in relation to the level of population trustworthiness 𝛼𝛼. 
(a) 𝛼𝛼 = 0. 
 
(b) 0 < 𝛼𝛼 < 1. 
 
(c) 𝛼𝛼 = 1. 
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Figure 3. Parametric example: equilibrium seller strategies supported by the model of fair 
payment norms. 
 
Notes: Figure displays the equilibrium seller bidding strategies as a function of population 
trustworthiness 𝛼𝛼 and fair payment norm 𝛾𝛾 for the following levels of contractual retainage: 
𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75. Based on the following cost and valuation schedules: 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿) = 0.30, 
𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻) = 0.40 , 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿) = 0.35  and 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻) = 0.80 . The numbers inside the shapes are the 
equilibrium bid amounts associated with the indicated quality level. An empty region 
corresponds to seller non-participation. 
 
3. Experiment and Hypotheses 
3.1 Experimental Design and Procedures 
In our laboratory setting, we consider the case of two potential sellers. The valuation and 
cost parameters associated with high and low quality are indicated in Table 1. These values were 
displayed on the computer screens of all subjects. We restrict bids to be integers. 
Table 1 – Experiment parameter values. 
Quality Level 𝑞𝑞 ∈ 𝑄𝑄 𝑞𝑞 = 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿 𝑞𝑞 = 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 
Buyer Valuations: 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞) 35 80 
Seller Costs: c(𝑞𝑞) 30 40 
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We employed a between-subjects design with three treatments that varied the retainage 
provision, 𝜌𝜌 ∈ {0, 0.50, 0.75} – see Table 2. The 𝜌𝜌 = 0  treatment benchmarks previous 
experiments in which payment of the full auction price is binding on the buyer, i.e., a fixed-price 
contract (cf. Auction treatment in Fugger et al. 2019).  The 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 treatment simulates a setting 
in which potential sellers can fully offset the risk of partial or non-receipt of retainage monies by 
increasing their bids at auction. By contrast, in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatment, there is no bid available 
at which a potential seller can ensure to avoid a loss during trade. Thus, in this treatment, 
profitable trade can proceed based on the buyer’s intent to compensate the seller for costs 
incurred – analogous to an LOI. We selected values 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50  and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75  for the non-zero 
retainage treatments because they are the easiest retainage provisions for subjects to 
comprehend within the appropriate intervals from Proposition 1. 
Table 2 – Experiment treatments. 
Treatment Retainage Level 
1 𝜌𝜌 = 0.00 
2 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 
3 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 
 
Subjects were randomly allocated to one of the three treatments and no subject 
participated in more than one session. Each treatment included six independent cohorts. There 
were three cohorts of the same treatment in every session. Each cohort consisted of three buyers 
and six sellers, who were randomly matched across 30 procurement interactions.19 A bespoke 
algorithm guaranteed that no participant in a cohort played with the same pair of individuals in 
any two consecutive interactions. A total of 162 human subjects participated in our experiment 
sessions, which were conducted at the laboratory of a large public university in the United States. 
Participants were students recruited using web-based recruitment software.  
All sessions followed the same protocol. Upon arrival, participants were seated at 
computer terminals and handed a written copy of the instructions to read in private. Terminals 
had physical dividers to prevent subjects from seeing the screens of other participants. The 
instructions were played from an audio recording at the front to ensure the description of the 
game was common knowledge and delivery consistent across sessions. The task was explained to 
subjects using a cover story related to the application of interest and the instructions included 
 
19 We did not inform subjects of the cohort size, to mitigate the possibility of tacit collusion in what might 
be considered a small cohort (see Katok 2011 for a discussion). 
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concrete terms such as “Buyer” and “Seller”. This was a deliberate choice to improve subject 
understanding (see Cooper and Kagel 2003) and increase external validity (see Katok 2017).20 
Participants completed a computerized test of understanding before being assigned to 
their role as a buyer or seller and matched into their first interaction group. Roles remained fixed 
throughout. Communication was prohibited and all interactions were anonymous. Own-group 
feedback was provided between periods. This information remained available in a history table 
to reinforce the game-theoretic assumption of “perfect recall”. At the end of a session, participants 
answered a non-incentivized questionnaire to elicit demographic information, attitudes to trust 
and risk. The experimental interface was programmed using oTree software (Chen et al. 2016).  
Subjects received monetary incentives for their participation. Each subject was paid his 
or her summed experiment earnings privately and in cash at the end of a session, in addition to a 
$5 show-up fee. Payment was made sequentially, with sufficient time intervals between any two 
subjects to mitigate against the possibility of side-payments. We used a symmetric exchange rate 
of 20 experiment currency units (ECU) to $1. Average subject earnings were $17.70 in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0 
treatment, $22.70 in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50  treatment and $25.00 in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75  treatment. Sessions 
lasted 60 to 75 minutes. Each subject received a non-refundable endowment of 7 ECU per period 
to cover potential losses. Subjects were informed that they would not leave the session with less 
than the show-up fee. 21  To reinforce the one-shot nature of interactions, we did not inform 
subjects about cumulative earnings until after the final period. 
3.2 Hypotheses 
Our theoretical predictions afford several testable experimental hypotheses, which are 
summarized in Table 3. Hypotheses 1 and 2 encapsulate the standard theory. In the 𝜌𝜌 = 0 and 
𝜌𝜌 = 0.50  treatments, sellers will bid enough to cover their cost of producing low quality, 
competing away their profits in the process. With our experiment parameters, self-interest 
implies Nash transaction efficiency of 12.5%, measured as the percentage of surplus realized out 
of the total made available. The only difference hypothesized between treatments is the 
equilibrium price. Potential sellers are predicted to double their bids in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 treatment 
to compensate for anticipated loss of retainage money. In the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatment, the retainage 
provision is too high for sellers to submit a profitable bid and so the market unravels. 
 
20 The instructions were framed in neutral language (see Zizzo 2010) and are contained in the Appendix B. 
We avoided the term “retainage”. Audio recordings are available on request. 
21 In the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatment, limited liability had to be imposed for two sellers. All results reported below 
hold if we exclude these two subjects from our analysis. In a pilot experiment, we tested the most extreme 
seller trust arrangement of 100% retainage. Seller losses, however, became a problem. Summary statistics 
for this variant are available on request. 
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We obtain alternative hypotheses from our model of fair payment norms. As shown in 
Figure 3, high quality is an equilibrium outcome in both the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatments, 
conditional on sufficiently – but not overly – optimistic beliefs about the level of population 
trustworthiness 𝛼𝛼 and the prevailing fairness norm 𝛾𝛾. This confirms that Proposition 2 applies to 
our experiment environment. Hypotheses 3 and 4 follow directly from Corollaries 1 and 3: high 
quality will be rewarded reciprocally with higher retainage payment rates than low quality, and 
unraveling is most likely to occur in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatment. High quality is not implementable in 
the 𝜌𝜌 = 0 treatment for any beliefs about 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛾𝛾. This is captured by Hypothesis 5. 
 
Table 3 – Experimental hypotheses. 
Hypothesis Support 
Standard Theory 
Hypothesis 1.  
For the 𝜌𝜌 = 0  and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50  treatments: (a) Prices will not exceed 
30/(1 − 𝜌𝜌), which equals 30 and 60, respectively; (b) Transactions 
will fail due to buyer rejection at prices greater than 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿)/(1 − 𝜌𝜌), 
which equals 35 and 70, respectively; (c) Sellers will produce low 
product quality at minimum cost, independently of their bid; (d) 
Buyers will make zero retainage payment; and (e) Buyer profit will 
equal five and seller profit will equal zero. 
Proposition 1A. 
Hypothesis 2.  
For the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75  treatment, potential sellers will choose not to 
participate in the Bidding Stage and the market will unravel. 
Proposition 1B. 
Model of Fair Payment Norms 
Hypothesis 3.  
In the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50  and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75  treatments, retainage payment rates 
will be positively related to the product quality level. 
Corollary 1. 
Hypothesis 4.  
Market unraveling is most likely to occur in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatment. 
Corollary 3. 
Hypothesis 5.  
High quality is more likely to be observed in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 treatment 
and/or the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatment than in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0 treatment. 
Proposition 2. 
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4. Experimental Results 
4.1 Aggregate Findings 
In Table 4, we present average values for the key outcome measures of our experiment.22 
Since there is no interaction between subjects playing in different cohorts, each cohort is 
considered a statistically independent observation. For each treatment, we have data from 540 
procurement interactions. 
As predicted by Hypothesis 1a, trade prices were significantly higher in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 
treatment than in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0 treatment (p-value = 0.001). While we statistically reject the point 
prediction that trade prices did not exceed 30 in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0 treatment (p-value = 0.031), we fail to 
reject an average price of 60 in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 treatment (p-value = 0.563).  
In contrast to Hypothesis 1b, there was a 31.5% buyer acceptance probability of prices 
above 35 in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0 treatment, which were observed at 184 auctions. In the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 treatment, 
a price above 70 was observed at just 14 auctions.  
Conditional on buyer acceptance, Hypothesis 1c is supported in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0 treatment. Low 
quality was chosen in 93.9% of transactions. There was a notable increase in market trust as 
represented by an improvement in average product quality in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50  and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75  
treatments. This cannot be explained by the standard theory.  
We reject Hypothesis 1d in favor of our reciprocal Hypothesis 3. A seller’s probability of 
receiving a non-zero retainage payment in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 treatment was 31% after choosing low 
quality and 61% after choosing high quality. Buyers paid to sellers 31.8% of retainage monies in 
exchange for high quality and just 6.1% in exchange for low quality. In the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatment, 
where the retainage amount represents a larger share of the agreed price, the respective 
probabilities of non-zero payments were 54% and 74% and payment rates were 15.6% and 
40.4%. The premiums paid for high quality are strongly significant (both p-values < 0.001).23 
The standard theory does not provide a satisfactory explanation of the observed profit 
distributions. In qualitative terms, the predicted distribution of buyer-seller profits was reversed 
in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0 treatment: sellers earned 1.60 more per period than buyers, a significant difference 
(p-value = 0.047). Thus, in this treatment, we reject Hypothesis 1e that sellers earn a profit of one 
(p-value = 0.031) and that buyers earn a profit of four (p-value = 0.063). 
 
 
22  We employ a two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test for one-sample comparisons and two-tailed 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for two-sample comparisons. When making multiple comparisons, we use 
Holm’s (1979) p-value adjustment method. We acknowledge the potential caveat of arbitrary static 
correlations within sessions (Fréchette, 2012). 
23 We also find strong evidence for our reciprocal Hypothesis 3 in a regression analysis of individual-level 
decisions: high quality increases the average retainage payment rate on average by 24 and 30 percentage 
points in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatments respectively (both p-values < 0.001). 
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Table 4 – Cohort means and standard deviations. 
 𝜌𝜌 = 0 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 
Price 35.08 57.79 57.21 
 (1.72) (5.42) (8.08) 
Seller Participation 0.99 0.98 0.64 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.26) 
Buyer Acceptance 0.60 0.91 0.98 
 (0.20) (0.08) (0.01) 
High Quality 0.06 0.30 0.50 
 (0.02) (0.20) (0.19) 
Retainage Payment N/A 0.15 0.29 
  (0.11) (0.14) 
For Low Quality  0.06 0.16 
  (0.07) (0.08) 
For High Quality  0.32 0.40 
  (0.16) (0.16) 
Market Unraveling 0.00 0.00 0.22 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.26) 
Transaction Efficiency 0.11 0.36 0.56 
 (0.03) (0.17) (0.17) 
Buyer Profit 2.83 15.83 31.40 
 (1.07) (7.65) (2.49) 
Seller Profit 4.43 -0.25 -8.75 
 (1.54) (1.60) (5.71) 
Notes: Displayed are mean (SD) values for the key experiment outcomes based on 6 independent 
cohort observations per treatment. Price, High Quality and Retainage Payment are conditional on at 
least one seller submitting a bid at auction and buyer acceptance of this price. Market Unraveling is 
a measure of the proportion of auctions which failed to attract a single bidder. Transaction Efficiency 
is a measure of the surplus captured in the period divided by the surplus that sellers had made 
available. Profit is expressed in ECU per period conditional on trade and excludes the endowment. 
 
In the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 treatment, profit outcomes were rather different. While sellers earned a 
profit no different from zero on average (p-value = 0.844), buyers earned 15.83, an economically 
large and significant increase versus the theoretical benchmark (p-value = 0.031). Sellers fared 
significantly worse in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatment, incurring an average loss of 8.75 as opportunistic 
buyers appropriated surplus to double their profits to 31.40. 
The experiment data also falsify Hypothesis 2: during 78% of auctions in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 
treatment, at least one seller submitted a bid for the buyer to accept or reject. Yet although the 
seller non-participation rate was only 1 to 2% in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0 and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 treatments, it was 36% 
in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75  treatment. Markets only unraveled in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75  treatment. This result 
supports Hypothesis 4. There is no significant difference in the average price between the non-
zero retainage treatments. Unsurprisingly, buyer acceptance rates were significantly higher in 
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these treatments than in the zero retainage arrangement (p-value = 0.013), reflecting the reduced 
buyer vulnerability to loss. In the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatment, nearly all auction prices were accepted.  
The proportion of transactions associated with high quality was 30.2% in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 
treatment and 50.4% in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75  treatment, although the difference between the two 
treatments is only marginally significant (p-value = 0.093). This suggests that the burden of trust 
required to realize high quality was indeed lower with a non-zero retainage provision, as 
predicted by Hypothesis 5. To gain greater insight into the distribution of trade outcomes among 
the three treatments, in Figure 4 we present the relative frequencies of trade by price and quality 
level, conditional on at least one bid being submitted and on buyer acceptance. Prices are grouped 
in intervals of 10.  
 
Figure 4. Relative frequencies of trade by price group and product quality. 
 
Notes: Based on 113 price-quality pairs across the experiment treatments. Relative 
frequencies are conditional on trade and do not reflect differences in the total number of 
transactions between treatments. 
 
We observe in the figure that more than 85% of transactions in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0 treatment were 
recorded in the price interval 30 to 39 and the quality of these transactions was near-uniformly 
low. More than 50% of transactions in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 treatment were observed in the price interval 
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60 to 69, and one in four of these was of high quality. Prices in this interval enabled the buyer to 
use her retainage return decision to impose the salient equal surplus split in exchange for high 
quality. A further 25% of transactions in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 treatment occurred in the interval 50 to 59 
and around half of these were of high quality. In the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatment, high quality was the 
majority choice for sellers at all prices over 50. That high quality was rarely observed at prices 
below 50 in the two non-zero retainage treatments is consistent with the range of implementable 
equilibrium seller bids shown in Figure 3. 
Overall, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that on average, transaction efficiency 
attained its Nash equilibrium level of 12.5% in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0 treatment (p-value = 0.31). There was, 
however, a substantial improvement relative to this level in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50  treatment (36% 
transaction efficiency, p-value = 0.007) and in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatment (56% transaction efficiency, 
p-value = 0.009). This supports Hypothesis 5. In Figure 5, we plot a time series of the market 
unraveling complement and transaction efficiency across the 30 periods in our experiment. The 
trend differences in transaction efficiency are pronounced. In the 𝜌𝜌 = 0 treatment, transaction 
efficiency fluctuated about its Nash equilibrium within the 0 to 25% interval. In the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 
treatment, transaction efficiency fluctuated within the 25 to 50% interval. The variability of this 
measure declined over time in both treatments. In the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatment, transaction efficiency 
began in the 25 to 50% interval but then trended consistently upwards over time. 
Market unraveling never occurred in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0 and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 treatments. In the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 
treatment, there was a marked unraveling in the proportion of auctions attracting at least one 
bidder after period five. This trend continued into the final period, at which point around half of 
markets unraveled. As a consequence, there is no significant difference in global efficiency – 
defined here as realized surplus out of total possible, rather than total made available by sellers 
– between the non-zero retainage treatments (p-value = 0.39). Notably, in the second half of the 
experiment, the difference in global efficiency between the 𝜌𝜌 = 0 and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatments is not 
significant at conventional threshold levels either (p-value = 0.13). By contrast, global efficiency 
remains significantly higher in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 treatment than in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0 treatment after period 
15 (p-value = 0.015). 
4.2 Learning and Bidding Dynamics 
Our theoretical analysis is equilibrium-based. Nevertheless, the aggregate results suggest 
scope for learning. We therefore conduct a formal analysis of the differences in decision-making 
and profit outcomes over time (see tables in the Appendix A).  
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Figure 5. Decomposition of market unraveling and transaction efficiency over time. 
 
Notes: Based on 18 interaction groups per treatment in a period. Unraveling Complement is 
one minus the proportion of auctions which failed to attract a single bidder. Transaction 
Efficiency is a measure of surplus realized divided by surplus made available. 
 
There are some statistically significant differences between periods 1 to 10 and 11 to 20. 
Sellers quickly learned to produce low quality in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0 treatment. In the other two treatments, 
as buyers lowered their retainage payment rates, sellers learned to raise their bids or, exclusively 
in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatment, not to participate in the Bidding Stage. After the first 20 periods, there 
is no further significant bid adjustment towards the equilibrium prediction. In the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 
treatment, there is no evidence of a significant improvement in profits over time to warrant a 
choice of high quality by those sellers willing to participate. Any narrowing of the observed profit 
differential between buyers and sellers across period blocks is confined to the 𝜌𝜌 = 0 and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 
treatments.  
As a first step in analyzing sellers’ bidding decisions, we code each seller non-
participation decision as a bid at one increment above the highest available in the experimental 
price grid.24 We then use a Tobit specification that censors the dependent variable from above 
 
24  It seems reasonable to suppose that non-participating sellers were unable to obtain a satisfactory 
guaranteed payment. 
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(Table 3). Standard errors are clustered at the subject level to account for the non-independence 
of observations. 25  We include the once lagged competitor’s bid and once lagged trade as 
independent variables, along with a time trend and individual attitudes to risk and trust elicited 
in the post-experiment questionnaire.26 Demographic information on subject age, gender, field of 
studies and income are used as control variables.  
There is strong statistical evidence that bids exhibited a positive dependency in the most 
recently matched competitor’s bid. In the 𝜌𝜌 = 0 treatment, bids trended downwards over time. A 
reverse temporal bidding trend emerges in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatments, corroborating 
the aggregate learning analysis. In all three treatments, subjects who traded in the prior period 
submitted significantly lower bids on average in the following period. The smaller sample size in 
the third column reflects the elevated rate of seller non-participation in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatment, 
which results in the absence of lagged competitor’s bids. 
 
Table 5 – Censored regression analysis of seller bidding behavior. 
 Bid 
 𝜌𝜌 = 0 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 
Competitor’s Bid t-1 0.24*** 0.51*** 0.38*** 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) 
Trade t-1 -4.68*** -6.35*** -5.76* 
 (0.86) (1.04) (2.48) 
Period -0.16* 0.16*** 0.55*** 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.12) 
Risk Index 0.08 0.60** -1.58 
 (0.43) (0.20) (1.15) 
Trust Index 1.81 0.75 10.21* 
 (2.80) (1.79) (4.59) 
Constant 26.73*** 29.98*** 48.99*** 
 (5.90) (8.76) (12.78) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes 
Log Likelihood -3390 -3448 -2033 
Observations 942 995 603 
Right-censored 11 22 142 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.  
The models were estimated using a Tobit regression with robust standard errors clustered at the 
subject level. Seller non-participation decisions are coded as bids equal to 81 at which level the tobit 
specification right censors the dependent variable. Control variables: dummies for female and 
economics/business major, age and income rank (coefficient estimates for these control variables are 
available from the authors on request). 
 
 
25 The results are qualitatively unchanged if we instead cluster standard errors at the cohort level. 
26 Similar results are obtained for the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 specifications if we include as a regressor the 
once-lagged retainage payment instead of the once-lagged trade indicator. Including both variables is not 
feasible due to multicollinearity. The risk and trust measures are non-incentivized and only suggestive. A 
few subjects did not provide a complete set of responses in the post-experiment questionnaire. The 
regression results are unchanged if we remove the control variables and use the full dataset. 
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4.3 Representative Cohort Outcomes 
To obtain detailed insight into cohort heterogeneity, we plot procurement outcomes for 
each of the three interaction groups in every period by cohort. Figure 6 displays these outcomes 
for two representative cohorts per treatment, which suffice to capture the main behavioral 
differences that emerged in the experiment. The remaining four experiment cohorts per 
treatment exhibit a mixture of the representative cohort dynamics.  
In Figure 6, the x-axis is the period-group and the y-axis is the winning auction price 
and/or total payment. An open triangle is an instance of market unraveling and a cross is an 
instance of transaction failure. A solid circle (square) is an accepted auction price at which the 
seller produced low (high) quality, and an open circle (square) is the corresponding total payment. 
The vertical arrows capture the differential between agreed price and total payment differential 
in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatments, i.e., when there is price flexibility in the contract. This 
approach yields 90 observations per cohort.  
The top left-hand panel of the figure exemplifies the disciplining power of competition in 
the 𝜌𝜌 = 0 treatment. After some initial learning, winning sellers in this cohort submitted bids in 
the 30 to 35 range and chose low quality. The top right-hand panel of the figure reveals a different 
dynamic: sellers attempted to elicit buyer trust and trade in the high-price region. Consistent with 
the standard theory, buyers rejected the majority of prices above 35. 
The two middle panels in the figure demonstrate the convergence of winning bids in the 
𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 treatment towards the Nash equilibrium price of 60 from below. In cohort 5, sellers 
consistently produced low quality, receiving little if any retainage payment. In some other cohorts, 
sellers attempted to sustain reciprocal and high quality procurement. Buyers in cohort 3, for 
example, rewarded this choice with total compensation above the cost of high quality. This again 
supports our reciprocal Hypothesis 3. However, vulnerability to loss – as realized in interactions 
with a payment arrowhead below 40 – undermined market trust.   
The bottom panels in the figure highlight opposing dynamics that emerged in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 
treatment. Sellers in cohort 6 largely chose not to participate in the Bidding Stage, as predicted 
by the standard theory. Two-thirds of markets unraveled in this cohort. In contrast, sellers in 
cohort 1 were more willing to produce a high quality product. Where a buyer failed to reciprocate, 
the seller downside was substantially larger than in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 treatment (longer arrows in the 
figure), resulting in seller losses. 
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Figure 6. Representative cohort outcomes over time. 
 
Notes: Panels display procurement outcomes over time in the specified treatment and 
cohort. Each observation corresponds to the outcome of a randomly matched interaction 
group in the period, with 1 buyer and 2 sellers. An open triangle is an instance of market 
unraveling, in which neither seller submitted a bid. A cross is a transaction failure, in which 
a buyer rejected the winning auction price. A solid circle is an accepted auction price at 
which the seller produced low quality. A solid square is an accepted auction price at which 
the seller produced high quality. An open circle and an open square are the corresponding 
total payments in instances where these differ from the auction price. In such instances, the 
vertical arrows represent the price-payment differential. 
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5. Estimating Trustworthiness and Fairness Norms 
In our model of fair payment norms, we reduced the buyer population to two types: 
trustworthy and self-interested. This simplification enabled us to characterize outcomes along 
the dimensions of population trustworthiness 𝛼𝛼  and fair payment norm 𝛾𝛾, for different 
contractual arrangements. High product quality was rarely observed in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0  treatment, 
consistent with the predictions of the model. In the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50  and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75  treatments, high 
quality was observed significantly more frequently, consistent with a range of equilibrium 
bidding strategies that vary with 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛾𝛾. While these parameters are latent, we can estimate the 
feasible set of joint parameters from buyer payment decisions in these treatments. To do this, we 
employ a tractable least absolute deviation (LAD) approach, which Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) 
used to apply their 𝛼𝛼 model to behavior in gift-exchange and trust game experiments. 
 First, we define a procurement “bucket” 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖(𝜌𝜌, 𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞)  as a group of procurement 
interactions that share the same retainage provision and price-quality outcome. In terms of the 
strategic interaction, 𝜌𝜌 determines the specification of the extensive form game, (𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞) specifies a 
penultimate information set and 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖  identifies the subset of observations reaching this 
information set. Observations within this subset vary by the buyer’s ultimate action. 
For each bucket, we compute the average actual buyer and seller profits observed in the 
experiment.27 We assign each bucket a weight according to its relative empirical frequency, i.e. 
the number of transactions in the bucket divided by the total number of transactions across all 
buckets (= 907).  For each bucket, we then calculate the buyer and seller profits predicted by the 
model of fair payment norms at all (𝛼𝛼, 𝛾𝛾) pairs in the unit square. This enables us to compute, for 
each bucket and pair, the absolute deviation between actual and predicted buyer and seller 
profits. Finally, we take the weighted sum of these absolute deviations across all buckets and for 
each (𝛼𝛼, 𝛾𝛾) pair. The following objective function described this calculation: 
�
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  (5) 
Results of the estimation are presented in Figure 7. The subset of joint parameter 
estimates yielding the minimum LAD are identified by the darkest shaded color in the figure. This 
subset is centered around 𝛼𝛼 = 0.40 and 𝛾𝛾 = 0.50. Our best estimate is thus that 40% of buyers in 
the experiment were trustworthy, and those buyers perceived an equal share of the surplus as 
 
27 Taking averages reduces noise at the cost of losing information from higher moments. The results of the 
LAD estimation are qualitatively unchanged if we instead conduct the exercise at the transaction level. The 
least deviation estimate of trustworthiness is the same at 𝛼𝛼 = 0.40. The estimate of 𝛾𝛾 using the transaction 
level data is less precise, but also covers the best estimate found using the averaged data. 
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fair. Payoff equality is normatively appealing (Konow 2003), and equal surplus sharing is 
commonly found at the firm level (see Andreoni and Bernheim 2009). 
We benchmark our estimates against previous studies. Using an analogous approach, 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) estimate a value of 𝛼𝛼 = 0.50 in the gift-exchange experiments of 
Fehr et al. (1993) and 0.42 in the trust game experiments of Berg et al. (1995). The best estimates 
of trustworthiness in our experiment then lie closest to trust game experiments. This is 
unsurprising; the post-auction phase of our procurement experiment has a trust-game flavor. Our 
estimate of 𝛾𝛾 predicts zero retainage payment for all interim seller surplus shares greater than 
one half. We observed this outcome in 137 out of 139 possible cases. Bolton and Ockenfels’ ERC 
model specifies 𝛾𝛾 = 0.50 by assumption. 
 
Figure 7. LAD estimates of the fairness model parameters. 
 
Notes: The heatmap presents the set of feasible joint parameter estimates of population 
trustworthiness 𝛼𝛼 and fair payment norm 𝛾𝛾, imputed from the experiment data. The color 
scale indicates the least absolute deviation (LAD) between average actual profits and those 
predicted by the model of fair payment norms (the unit is ECU). The darkest shaded region 
corresponds to joint parameter estimates that yield the minimum LAD between model’s 
predictions and realized outcomes. 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
The managerial literature has devoted substantial attention to how auction institution 
design can improve efficiency for procurement. In first price reverse auctions, standard principal-
agent models show that high product quality equilibria do not exist due to moral hazard. The 
identification of alternative mechanisms that can reap the benefits of price competition while 
sustaining cooperation is of considerable managerial value. We develop a model of fair payment 
norms and show that flexibility in the contract price through retainage incentives can help to 
circumvent the inevitable degradation of seller quality, as long as prevailing payment norms 
induce the anticipation of reciprocal buyer payments. 
In our experiments, we find that the probability of high product quality is significantly 
increased in non-zero retainage arrangements relative to the benchmark zero retainage case. We 
also observe a marked trade-off between transaction efficiency and transaction fairness, due to 
the difficulty in sustaining trustworthy buyer payment behavior over time. When sellers are 
engaged informally, with no payment guarantee to cover production costs, we observe a marked 
unraveling in markets over time. This reduces procurement efficiency, despite the higher quality 
of transactions remaining in the market. 
The experiment results reinforce the finding of Fugger et al. (2019) that reverse auctions 
perform poorly from an efficiency perspective with rigid fixed-price contracts. The benefits of 
mechanisms that permit buyers to incorporate aspects other than price in their procurement 
decisions have been discussed in detail (see, e.g., Englebrecht-Wiggans et al. 2007). Here we 
demonstrate that attention should also be given to the flexibility of the contractual price, even 
when price cannot be ex ante conditioned upon product quality. 
The main message for procurement managers and construction industry practitioners is 
as follows. Retainage mechanisms, and deferred payments more generally, have a useful role in 
incentivizing sellers to provide high quality. This recommendation comes with two caveats. First, 
informal procurement arrangements, such as LOIs, can end up having an anti-competitive effect 
by discouraging potential sellers from participating in the market. Second, if retainage monies are 
not properly administered, sellers are left vulnerable to the payment malpractices of 
untrustworthy buyers. This can undermine seller profitability relative to fixed-price contracts 
and the deductibility of retainage throughout the supply chain would likely amplify these negative 
effects. Practitioners should remain cognizant of industry payment norms when designing 
contractual incentives. 
Our study suggests that future research might usefully examine the effects of 
incorporating dispute resolution into the procurement setup, for example via arbitration. In the 
model outlined here, sellers are endowed with no bargaining power after the auction and cannot 
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dispute the buyer’s retainage return decision. This assumption is clearly restrictive. In a 
consumer setting, Andreoni (2018) observes that some legal enforcement is required to induce 
buyer trust when goods are sold with a “satisfaction guarantee”. Nevertheless, formal litigation is 
often costly and alternative dispute mechanisms under-developed. Consideration could also be 
given to the impact of a buyer’s payment record in the procurement process. Reputation has been 
observed to improve seller trustworthiness in reverse auctions with moral hazard (Brosig-Koch 
and Heinrich 2014). 
We also note that the retainage-type incentives examined in this study are a feature of 
performance bonuses in principal-agent relationships more generally.  Employment contracts 
often contain a fixed base payment, with the promise of discretionary rewards in the future (see 
also Fehr et al. 2007, Lee et al. 2018). In certain industries, such as finance or professional sports, 
these voluntary bonus payments may be the most lucrative part of the compensation package. A 
similar mechanism is used in the rental housing market by landlords, who withhold deposits as a 
percentage of the total rental price – typically amounting to one or two month’s rent – to 
incentivize tenants to take good care of their property.28 When there is an excess supply of agents, 
the motivating effects of performance bonuses are not obvious (MacLeod and Malcomson 1998). 
We provide evidence from a competitive bidding environment to suggest that implicit incentives 
can help mitigate the moral hazard problem, under such conditions of market imbalance. 
Finally, an open question is the extent to which models of fairness, originally developed 
to explain personal exchanges, apply to the more impersonal setting of firm decision-making. We 
find that deriving common thresholds as to the likelihood of a buyer or seller in the market acting 
in good faith is a useful one. We acknowledge, however, that in repeated interactions the 
reference point may be path-dependent. This possibility is not captured by our static equilibrium 
model and is a productive avenue for further theoretical work. 
 
28  Arrangements to pay “half now, half later” also seem to be popular with criminal and gangster 
organizations, at least as portrayed in the movies. 
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Appendix A: Learning analysis (relates to Section 4.2 of the main text). 
Table A. 1 – Cohort means and standard deviations of decision variables by period block. 
 
𝜌𝜌 = 0 
Periods 1-10 Periods 11-20 Periods 21-30 
Bid 42.49 40.69+ 38.24 
 (4.64) (4.69) (4.20) 
Seller Participation 0.98 0.99 0.99 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Buyer Acceptance 0.56 0.53+ 0.73 
 (0.20) (0.24) (0.22) 
High Quality 0.15* 0.03 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) 
 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 
Bid 57.61** 63.46+ 64.75 
 (5.66) (6.47) (5.72) 
Seller Participation 0.99 0.99 0.95 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) 
Buyer Acceptance  0.94 0.90 0.89 
 (0.03) (0.08) (0.15) 
High Quality 0.31 0.35 0.24 
 (0.08) (0.23) (0.33) 
Retainage Payment for Low Quality 0.10* 0.05 0.03 
 (0.10) (0.08) (0.05) 
Retainage Payment for High Quality 0.40 0.27 0.33 
 (0.25) (0.17) (0.09) 
 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 
Bid 55.22* 64.47 62.35 
 (4.43) (9.51) (16.21) 
Seller Participation 0.83* 0.59 0.50 
 (0.16) (0.31) (0.37) 
Buyer Acceptance 0.96+ 0.99 1.00 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) 
High Quality 0.37 0.53 0.55 
 (0.15) (0.25) (0.37) 
Retainage Payment for Low Quality 0.19 0.12 0.09 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) 
Retainage Payment for High Quality 0.39 0.36 0.35 
 (0.18) (0.24) (0.20) 
Notes: Displayed are mean (SD) values for the key decision variables based on 6 independent cohort 
averages per treatment. Matched pairs t-test (two-sided) comparing averages between adjacent blocks, 
+ indicates significant difference between adjacent blocks at the 0.10 level * indicates significance at the 
0.05 level; ** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. 
 
36 
 
 
Table A. 2 – Cohort means and standard deviations of Buyer and Seller profits by period block. 
 
𝜌𝜌 = 0 
Periods 1-10 Periods 11-20 Periods 21-30 
Buyer Profit 4.16 0.97+ 2.93 
 (4.31) (1.99) (1.37) 
Seller Profit 5.95 5.17+ 2.89 
 (3.19) (2.27) (0.75) 
 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 
Buyer Profit 17.99 16.77+ 12.06 
 (2.09) (9.58) (13.13) 
Seller Profit -2.30 0.40+ 1.41 
 (2.14) (2.45) (2.20) 
 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 
Buyer Profit 29.38 30.11 33.16 
 (4.40) (4.69) (8.31) 
Seller Profit -11.34 -6.72 -8.90 
 (3.06) (7.56) (9.13) 
Notes: Displayed are mean (SD) values for the buyer and seller transaction profits based on 6 
independent cohort averages per treatment. Matched pairs t-test (two-sided) comparing averages 
between adjacent blocks, + indicates significant difference between adjacent blocks at the 0.10 level * 
indicates significance at the 0.05 level; ** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. 
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Appendix B: Experimental instructions. 
This is an experiment in decision making. If you read these instructions carefully and 
make good decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money. The amount of money you 
earn will depend on both your decisions and the decisions of other participants. The currency 
unit in this experiment is called Experimental Currency Unit, or ECU for short. At the end of the 
session, you will be asked to complete a short questionnaire. Upon completion, your total 
earnings from the experiment will be displayed on the screen, including your participation fee of 
$5, and be paid to you in private and in cash. 
How you earn money 
For today’s session, one-third of you will be randomly assigned a Buyer role, and two-
thirds of you assigned a Seller role. You will see your role at the start of the session and this role 
will not change for the duration of the session. This experiment will include 30 rounds. In each 
round a Buyer is matched with two Sellers. The Buyer can purchase a product from one of the 
two Sellers. The value of the product to the Buyer, and the cost that the Seller incurs to provide 
the product, depends on the Seller choice to deliver a High or Low Quality product, as follows:  
 Low Quality High Quality 
Buyer Value 35 80 
Seller Cost 30 40 
Each player will start each round with 7 ECU. Therefore, when there is a transaction between a 
Buyer and a Seller, 
• The Buyer earns:  7 + Profit, where Profit = Buyer Value – Payment to the Seller 
• The Seller earns:  7 + Profit, where Profit = Payment to the Seller – Seller Cost 
How a potential Seller is determined 
An auction is used to select which of the two Sellers will have the opportunity to transact 
with the Buyer. At the start of each round, each Seller privately submits a bid for a price at which 
they would be willing to deliver the product or elects not to participate in the current round’s 
auction. The Seller submitting the lower bid wins the opportunity to potentially trade with the 
Buyer. In the event of a tie, the computer will choose the winner at random. Bids can be integers 
from 30 to 80.  
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Example:  
Seller A bids 35 and Seller B bids 62 = A is winner.  
Sellers A and B both bid 40 = A and B each have 50% probability of winning. 
A Seller who does not win or elects not to participate in the auction earns 7 ECU for the 
round (Profit = 0). After the auction, the Buyer is presented the winning bid. The Buyer chooses 
whether or not to proceed with the transaction. If the Buyer does not proceed the round ends and 
all three parties earn 7 ECU for the round (Profit = 0). 
How the payment to the Seller is determined 
Participants in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0 treatment received the following instructions:  
If the Buyer chooses to proceed, the Winning Seller receives payment equal to his or her 
bid amount. Then the Winning Seller must decide to deliver either a Low or High Quality product. 
Examples: 
• Suppose the winning bid is 50 and the Seller delivers Low Quality. The round profits for 
the Buyer and Winning Seller are as follows: 
Buyer Profit = 35 – 50 = –15* 
Seller Profit = 50 – 30 = 20 
• Now suppose the Seller delivers High Quality. The respective profits are: 
Buyer Profit = 80 – 50 = 30 
Seller Profit = 50 – 40 = 10 
*Note that it is possible to lose money in a round. Make your decisions carefully. 
Participants in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 treatment received the following instructions:  
If the Buyer chooses to proceed, the Winning Seller receives 50% of his or her bid amount. 
This is called the initial payment. Then the Winning Seller must decide to deliver either a Low 
or High Quality product. The Buyer learns the quality level of the product and then chooses how 
much of the remaining 50% of the winning auction bid is paid to the Seller. This amount is called 
the deferred payment. The Buyer keeps any portion of the remaining 50% of the bid not paid to 
the seller. 
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Examples: 
• Suppose the winning bid is 50, the Seller delivers Low Quality, and the Buyer sets the 
deferred payment at 6. The round profits for the Buyer and Winning Seller are as follows: 
Buyer Profit = 35 – 25 – 6 = 4 
Seller Profit = 25 – 30 + 6 = 1 
• Now suppose the Seller delivers High Quality and the Buyer still sets the deferred 
payment at 6. The respective profits are: 
Buyer Profit = 80 – 25 – 6 = 49 
Seller Profit = 25 – 40 + 6 = –9* 
• Now Suppose the winning bid is 70, the Seller delivers High Quality and the Buyer sets 
the deferred payment at 30. The respective profits are: 
Buyer Profit = 80 – 35 – 30 = 15 
Seller Profit = 35 – 40 + 30 = 25 
*Note that it is possible to lose money in a round. Make your decisions carefully. 
Participants in the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatment received the following instructions:  
If the Buyer chooses to proceed, the Winning Seller receives 25% of his or her bid amount. 
This is called the initial payment. Then the Winning Seller must decide to deliver either a Low 
or High Quality product. The Buyer learns the quality level of the product and then chooses how 
much of the remaining 75% of the winning auction bid is paid to the Seller. This amount is called 
the deferred payment. The Buyer keeps any portion of the remaining 75% of the bid not paid to 
the seller. 
Examples: 
• Suppose the winning bid is 60, the Seller delivers Low Quality, and the Buyer sets the 
deferred payment at 16. The round profits for the Buyer and Winning Seller are as follows: 
Buyer Profit = 35 – 15 – 16 = 4 
Seller Profit = 15 – 30 + 16 = 1 
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• Now suppose the Seller delivers High Quality and the Buyer still sets the deferred 
payment at 16. The respective profits are: 
Buyer Profit = 80 – 15 – 16 = 49 
Seller Profit = 15 – 40 + 16 = –9* 
• Now Suppose the winning bid is 72, the Seller delivers High Quality and the Buyer sets 
the deferred payment at 44. The respective profits are: 
Buyer Profit = 80 – 18 – 44 = 18 
Seller Profit = 18 – 40 + 44 = 22 
*Note that it is possible to lose money in a round. Make your decisions carefully. 
How you will be paid 
At the end of the session the earnings from all rounds of the session will be converted to 
US dollars at the rate of 20 ECU for $1. These earnings will be added to your $5 participation fee, 
displayed on your screen, and paid to you at the end of the session. 
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Example experimental interface screenshot for sellers: 
 
 
Example experimental interface screenshot for buyers: 
 
 
Note: In the 𝜌𝜌 = 0.50 and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 treatments, a slider with random initial value was used to 
avoid anchoring bias. A calculator displayed buyer and seller profits for the different available 
deferred payments. 
